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ABSTRACT
This work describes the price risk involved in developing an Alaska Natural Gas 
Pipeline. Three alternatives were developed. They are an ALCAN Only 4.5 Bcf/day 
case, a Y-line case, and an ALCAN Only 5.5 Bcf/day case. The simulation result 
supports the conclusion that the ALCAN Only 4.5 Bcf/day case would be the most 
feasible and flexible choice for the long-run gas development with less commodity 
risk. Also, the price credit simulation was run based on the ELA natural gas price 
forecast. It shows how a Federal Tax Credit helps to reduce price risk making this 
marginal project more acceptable for participating oil companies. However it might 
not be revenue neutral for the Federal Government.
The risk-assessment model was constructed in the Excel spreadsheet with a 
commercially purchased add-in feature (@RISK by Palisade Corp.) that performed 
the Monte Carlo simulation and the probabilistic outcomes. It was designed to be a 
dynamic tool that could estimate production performance with associated costs, and 
product prices to yield an economic analysis1. The model was specifically designed 
for the Alaska Natural Gas Pipeline.
This work could be useful for government, companies, and any individual, who is 
currently involved with the Alaska Natural Gas Act.
1 The economic evaluation model used in this study is modified from NERA Economic Model 
version 2.64 (Northern Economic Research Associate’s Economic Model of Alaska North Slope Gas 
Utilization), which created by Michael Backus.
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91 INTRODUCTION
The profit margin of an oil or gas pipeline development project is very sensitive to 
the price of the product. Since all those developments are long-term projects and 
require a lot of capital investment, a pipeline project holds a lot of risk because of 
unpredictable gas prices. Therefore, price risk analysis is necessary for good project 
decision-making. It is especially true for the development of an Alaska Natural Gas 
Pipeline.
In the short run, project costs are predictable. We assumed that the capital 
investment is proportional to the level of production. However for an integral risk 
study of an oil or gas field development project, capital cost and production are both 
key uncertain factors, and need to be taken into consideration. In this study, special 
attention was put on gas price uncertainty.
The success of risk assessment critically depends on the reliability of the input 
distributions. The probabilistic estimates for gas prices were based on results 
generated from detailed work with historical price data and EIA projected gas prices. 
These results show that the historical gas prices should follow certain types of 
distributions, which are defined by mean and standard deviation. From the historical 
best-fit model, the monthly standard deviation and the yearly standard variation 
were obtained. Therefore, the input distribution of each price in a monthly 
simulation model was just a distribution function with a mean of EIA’s forecast 
value and a monthly standard deviation. The same method was used to obtain the 
price distribution function of each year during production period.
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Alaska Natural Gas Pipeline Projects
2.1.1 General Information
The North Slope contains plenty of available gas to support a large gas sale. Along 
with the oil, Alaska North Slope reservoirs contain at least 35 trillion cubic feet 
(TCF) of gas. Currently, when this field’s gas comes up with the oil, the operators of 
the Prudhoe Bay Unit, Phillips and BP, inject this gas back into the reservoir to keep 
pressure levels high and recover more oil.
However, the huge costs of a gas transportation project make the prospects for this 
gas sale project uncertain, and the relationship between the working interest owners 
complicates the problem. Two key elements are especially important: pipeline route 
and commodity risk. The Alaska State Legislation2 favors the Alaska Highway route 
for the pipeline, the same route that was designated in the Alaska Natural Gas 
Transportation Act of 1976, acknowledged by President Carter in 1977, and 
supported in international agreements with Canada. The State of Alaska supports the 
tax credit provision imbedded in the U.S. Congress Energy Bill to reduce the risk of 
investment in natural gas pipeline.
2.1.2 Background
Some background information is necessary to understand the Prudhoe Bay 
producers’ interests in the oil and gas reserves contained in the main reservoir at 
Prudhoe Bay. The major producers are BP Alaska Exploration, Phillips Alaska Inc. 
(now ConnocoPhillips) and Exxon Mobile. These producers own leases on the land 
overlaying at the Prudhoe Bay reservoir. Through these leases, the producers 
acquired a “working interest” in the oil and gas recoverable from these leases. This 
“working interest” entitles the producers to ownership of recovered oil and gas with
2 Under Sec.38.35, the State of Alaska reserves to itself all powers for right-of-way purposes.
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the requirement that they pay the costs associated with such production. The 
producers must also pay the State’s “royalty interest.” This interest provides the 
State with a 12.5% of the produced oil and gas (or 12.5% of the value of that oil and 
gas) without the obligation to pay the costs associated with that production. Some of 
these leases originally overlay principally oil reserves, while other leases principally 
overlay gas reserves, in unitizing their working interests in these leases, the 
producers agreed on a single plan of development and operation for the field. The 
producer, however, did not agree to a single participating interest in the oil and gas 
reserves. Therefore, they created two Initial Participating Areas (IPA’s): the Oil 
Rim Participating Area (Oil Rim), and the Gas Cap Participating Area (Gas Cap) to 
allocate to each producer the production and the cost obligation for the oil leases 
and gas leases respectively.
Because some producers mostly own leases principally overlying oil reserves, while 
others mostly own leases principally over gas reserves, each producer’s share of oil 
in the Oil Rim differs substantially from that same producer’s share of gas in the 
Gas Cap. While BP owns just slightly more than 50% of the working interest in the 
Oil Rim, it only has a 13% working interest in the Gas Cap. Phillips and Exxon 
Mobile together only have 44% working interest in the Oil Rim, but together they 
own about 85% of the working interest in the Gas Cap. Phillips and Exxon 
Mobile’s 85% interest in the Gas Cap does not mean they own 85% of the reservoir 
gas because not all of that gas is in the Gas Cap. The gas resource in the main 
Prudhoe Bay reservoir includes not only the large volume of gas in the Gas Cap, but 
also the smaller (but still very large) volume of gas originally dissolved in the oil in 
the Oil Rim. If a Major Gas Sale from the Prodhoe Bay Unit were to take place, gas 
from the Oil (about 30% of the total gas) and the Gas Cap would be marketed 
together. So Phillips and Exxon Mobile will each own a 37% working interest in the 
total gas in the reservoir (both Gas Cap and Oil Rim gas) while BP owns a 24% 
working interest in this gas resource.
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The governing contract for the Prudhoe Bay Unit, the Prudhoe Bay Unit Operating 
Agreement (1977) (PBUOA), specifies how to allocate commercial substances (oil, 
condensate, natural gas liquids, and natural gas) to the Gas Cap and Oil Rim, and by 
extension, to BP, ARCO and Exxon Mobile. The PBUOA also allocates costs and 
obligation to supply field fuel to the participating areas, and consequently, to the 
working interest owners. The producers have amended these product and cost 
allocation provisions of the PBUOA by, among other agreements, the Issues 
Resolution Agreement (1992)(IRA). Pursuant to these arrangements, the product 
and cost allocations change when a “Major Gas Sale”, as that term is defined in the 
PBUOA commences. A Major Gas Sale occurs when the volume delivered to a 
Major Gas Pipeline for transportation off the North Slope of Alaska has equaled or 
exceeded 1.75 billion cubic feet.
The PBUOA provides for a myriad of product and cost allocation methods. These 
allocations relate first to the products or type of costs allocated, and second to three 
specified periods in the field’s development life. The PBUOA has a different 
allocation method for each commercial substance-separator liquid (oil and 
condensate), natural gas liquids (NGLs), and sales gas. This agreement also 
allocates field operating costs, tax obligations, and capital expenditures in different 
ways.3
2.1.3 History
“A pipeline for Alaskan natural gas has been discussed since the 1970’s. In 1977, 
the United States and Canada signed an agreement in principle for the Alaska 
Natural Gas Transportation System (ANGTS) that proposed the delivery of 2 billion 
cubic feet per day from the Alaskan North Slope, along the Alaskan-Canadian 
highway to near Calgary, Alberta, and down to the lower 48. Initial cost estimates
3 This agreement may have been changed in 1999 or 2000 with the sale of ARCO assets to 
ConnocoPhillips.
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for ANGTS, including delivery to the lower 48, were $14.6 billion (1988 estimate, 
in 1988 dollars.)”4
Observers of failed previous attempts to market Alaska natural gas cite a number of 
reasons for no action including gas prices, producer reluctance to finance projects 
where they had no equity position, government controls, lack of markets, and bad 
economics.
Discussion of a natural gas pipeline from Alaska resurfaced in 1999 and 2000, when 
high gas prices5 led to a re-evaluation of the feasibility of developing Alaskan gas 
reserves. Phillips, BP, and ExxonMobil formed a partnership to investigate the 
potential of developing gas pipeline.
2.1.4 The Complexity of the Problem
The issues surrounding the economics of various gas line alternatives are very 
complex. From the perspective of the State of Alaska, we can summarize the main 
objectives for the state into three primary components.
First Goal: Maximize Tax Revenue
First and foremost is that whichever route is undertaken, and the timing of it, 
ownership interests, socio-economic impacts, and other aspects such as tax matters, 
the amount of revenue that the state accrues over the life of the project, with 
consideration for the time value of money (meaning sooner is better than later), may 
be the most important criteria. Revenue estimates range from a low of perhaps $3 
billion to a high of $15 billion over the life of producible reserves, depending upon 
the project. The problem is that what is best for the producers (such as BP, Exxon 
and Phillips), may not be what is best for the state. BP and Exxon have many other 
projects around the world that compete with Alaska gas, and it may be in their
4 “The Effects of the Alaska Oil and Natural Gas Provisions of H.R.4 and S. 1766 on U.S. Energy 
Markets”, by EIA, February 2002.
5 The Energy Information Agency reports that Southern California city gate spot market prices 
exceeded $59 per MMbtu on December 11, 2000. This translates to over $250 per barrel of oil.
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interest to wait many years, if not decades, before internal economics would be 
satisfied by delivering Alaska gas to world markets. Phillips has closer interests to 
Alaska as more of their asset base is tied up in Alaskan oil and gas.
The way the State of Alaska most benefits from a gas line in terms of revenues is by 
having the highest wellhead values, meaning the value of the gas when it reaches 
consuming markets, less transportation and other associated costs of getting it 
there. High wellhead values with high production rates in the earliest possible 
timeframe best suits the state from a revenue perspective.
Second Goal: Maximize Gas Industry Development in State
A second goal for the State of Alaska might be to have and maintain an industry that 
employs many Alaskans in a value-added process after the line is finished. In this 
regard employment levels that exist once a pipeline project is complete are more 
important than construction jobs. Even though construction jobs are indeed 
important, they often go to transient and out-of-state workers who pay little or no 
taxes, but require state and local services. Federal laws prohibit strict preferences for 
local hire. Alaska has a history of boom and bust cycles. Only the prospects for 
significant permanent employment justify the costs associated with large temporary 
employment cycles.
Third Goal: Maximize Alaska Access to Gas for State Economic Needs
The final critical goal for the State of Alaska to achieve through a gas project is to 
have sufficient supplies of our own gas be made available for consumption and use 
within the state. Both the interior of Alaska and South central Alaska have critical 
needs for access to in-state gas. Not only because it represents the best opportunity 
for low cost energy, but also because Cook Inlet gas is running out, and the 
alternatives for producing electricity and heating homes are not good.
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The upshot of all these is that it will take a balance of both coordinated and 
competing economic interests in order for a gas supply system to be developed in 
Alaska.
2.1.5 Gas Project Alternatives
For different economic incentives and from various perspectives, there are in effect 
five different gas project alternatives that are open for discussion, and under 
consideration. One is referred to as the “Over the Top” project that sends gas 
direction from the North Slope of Alaska into Canada. Another is “ALCAN 
Highway” project, which is embraced by the governor of Alaska. In Addition, 
Tidewater LNG project has been put forward for discussion and analysis for a long 
time. The fourth one is called “Y Project” which combines tidewater LNG and 
ALCAN Highway routines. The fifth one is so called Alaska GTL (Gas to Liquid) 
Option, which considers translating natural gas to liquid by chemical processing, 
and then shipping to the market through existing TAPS system. For each proposal, 
their pros and cons are discussed as follows.
2.1.5.1 “Over the Top” Project
This project starts on the Alaska North Slope (ANS) and then moves east along the 
northwestern section of Canada to pick up additional gas from their Mackenzie 
Delta, then south to the Lower 48 toward Chicago and the Midwest. This route may 
have advantages to BP and Exxon because it adds large volumes of proven reserves 
of gas sufficient to gain economies of scale. However, from an Alaskan perspective, 
because of the short length in Alaska, it will produce lower property tax revenue, 
and the quantity of North Slope gas sold will be limited. Even though it would 
provide construction and permanent jobs, they might amount to less than would be 
anticipated in other projects. It also has the disadvantage of not providing access to 
gas for Alaskan consumption.
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Producers are reported to favor an option for developing Alaska’s gas that would 
construct a large diameter (no compressor stations) buried offshore pipeline to the 
Mackenzie Delta, then a pipeline to carry both Alaska gas and Canadian gas to the 
lower 48 market. The 350 to 400 mile offshore portion of this project would be 
buried in approximately 40 feet of water in a trench sufficiently deep to provide a 14 
foot soil cover depth for ice scour protection. It has been estimated that the offshore 
portion can be completed in a single year. The same issues regarding supply and 
demand apply to this project as apply to shipping natural gas to the lower 48 
through the ALCAN project. The producers have said this route will produce the 
greatest wellhead netback. Some analysis shows that the economics and risk are 
even worse for Alaska than the ALCAN project, and that this route would increase 
wellhead netback for Canadian resource developers (BP and Exxon) at the cost of 
Alaska gas. The estimated cost reported for this option is $6.0 billion for both the 
Alaskan and Canadian portions of the pipeline. A Northwest Territories (NWT) 
government study estimated the cost of the system at $6.6 billion. The NWT 
estimate for a stand-alone gas pipeline from the Mackenzie Delta is $2.5 billion. 
The press releases do not say whether or not the cost estimates include compressor 
stations. The cost of gas conditioning plants is most certainly not included. This 
would increase their estimates.
The status of route soil investigations, engineering feasibility, construction estimates 
and construction schedule are unknown at present.
The “over the top” options presents a formidable engineering challenge in 
developing the technology for laying large diameter pipelines in a deep trench 
considering the ice conditions in the Arctic ocean environment. Subsea permafrost 
could present an equally formidable challenge. The construction schedule of a single 
year, given the seasonal constraints and potential sea ice conditions is equally 
challenging. The risk of construction delays and the potential technical delays 
associated with this project cast considerable doubt as to the feasibility and viability
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of the option. Additionally, most of the route is in remote areas without existing 
infrastructure. Along with technical problems, the project has permitting and legal 
problems that may delay construction and market entry.
A more feasible engineering option for the northern segment of this project that 
minimizes technical risk is a smaller diameter buried onshore pipeline (with 
compressor stations) through the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge and the Northern 
Yukon Territory. The construction cost for this option is likely to be less than the 
offshore options when all design details and risks are addressed.
This onshore option would have to be permitted under title 11 of Alaska National 
Interest Lands Conservation Act.
2.1.5.2 ALCAN Highway Project
Another proposal, and one embraced currently by the Knowles aubemational 
administration, is the ALCAN Highway project. It would provide more Alaskan 
construction and permanent jobs than the “Over the Top” route, and would provide 
limited access to gas for Alaskan consumption. So far this project has not been 
adopted as a preferred project by any of the major oil company participants, but is in 
the running for serious consideration. It gathers less Canadian gas, and would 
deliver gas to a hungry lower 48 market. It may be economical from an overall 
investment perspective, but depending upon market conditions, may provide limited 
revenue to the state. This depending upon how transportation and other costs are 
allocated, to the potential detriment of Alaskan gas wellhead values.
2.1.5.3 Tidewater LNG Proposal
The Tidewater LNG proposal would run from the North Slope along the existing oil 
pipeline, and either delivers gas to Valdez or head west from the Copper River 
Valley and delivers the gas to Cook Inlet for conditioning into a cold liquid for 
transportation via special tankers. Advantages of this project include significant
18
construction and permanent jobs, access to gas in both interior and south central 
Alaska, and the potential for perhaps the highest revenue source to the state. The 
disadvantage is that it may not represent the best deal for producers, particularly 
BP. Since a Tidewater project has the flexibility of delivering gas to various ports 
via tankers to both Asia and the West Coast and Mexico, it may compete with other 
projects BP has underway in Southeast Asia. It may be difficult to wrestle adequate 
supplies of gas from BP to generate appropriate economies of scale. The absence of 
a project to deliver gas to market may be better for BP than delivering Alaskan gas 
that competes with other supply sources they already have in place.
There have also been serious efforts on the part of communities along a proposed 
tidewater route by their respective mayors. This “Mayors Proposal” would 
anticipate tax exempt financing and may reduce the cost of construction and the cost 
of operations. Usually large public finance projects require significant amounts of 
equity capital at risk in order to attract public markets money. This one may be 
feasible from an economic perspective, but is currently hamstrung by a variety of 
factors including a lack of large amounts of equity. However it still is open for 
serious discussion and should not be ruled out if major obstacles could be 
overcome.
LNG represents only a small proportion of the natural gas market, but its share is 
forecast to grow dramatically, particularly in markets in the Asia Pacific region 
where pipeline gas supplies are for the most part not economic, infeasible due to 
location, or not available. LNG market prices however may continue to track world 
oil prices with a premium due to strong demand, the need for long-term supply from 
politically stable countries and the environmental benefits of using natural gas.
2.1.5.4 Alaska GTL (Gas-To-Liquid) Option
The technology for converting natural gas into high-quality liquids may satisfy the 
need of marketing the large volumes of available natural gas located far from
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markets. A literature, White Paper: Alaska Natural Gas, shows both benefits and 
obstacles of an Alaskan GTL Project.
Benefits
Unlike the pipeline or LNG alternatives, a GTL project can be developed 
in stages reducing technological and financial risks.
Products can be shipped on a batch basis through the existing TAPS line 
that will continue to have available capacity. This will extend the 
economic life of the pipeline reduce the cost of transporting all liquids and 
enhance the value of this pipeline asset. This may require the construction 
of additional storage.
GTL may also be blended with ANS crude, although this would not allow 
producers to capture the full value of the GTL components.
A GTL project could provide the earliest method for monetizing gas 
reserves for the benefit of all stakeholders, with minimum exposure of 
capital.
Alaska is geographically close to consumers in the US West Coast and in 
the Asia Pacific region.
Environmental opposition would be significantly less than for a pipeline or 
LNG alternative.
Because of the gas volumes involved and the flexibility in expansion, the 
pursuit and later development of either a major LNG or pipeline project is 
not compromised.
Significant facilities would need to be constructed on the North Slope.
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Obstacles
• The cost of building a demonstration plant on the North Slope to verify the 
technology and economics would likely cost 25-30 percent more than 
construction in more accessible and less environmentally challenging areas.
• A North Slope GTL plant with a $1.00 per MMBtu inlet gas cost would 
require a $27~$28 per barrel equivalent WTI to achieve a 15 percent rate 
of return. This $2~$3 per barrel higher world oil price is required because 
of the pipeline charge between the producing area and Valdez.
• The desire for gas service that would be made possible by the building of a 
gas pipeline would not be realized.
• Initially only a small volume of gas would be used.
The GTL option for the development of Alaska North Slope natural gas has not 
received much attention before. It was thought to be less market competitive than a 
natural gas pipeline to the lower 48. Additionally, concerns about waxing problems 
in the transport of GTL products in the Trans Alaska Pipeline System have been 
expressed by one of the pipeline owners. However, a recent report by Purvin & 
Gertz may breathe new life into the Alaska GTL option.
The following excerpts are quoted from an article by Roland George, Principal, 
Purvin & Gertz, Inc. in Gas-to-Liquids News, Vol. 4, No. 1 via COMTEX. Purvin 
& Gertz assumed that a 100,000 barrels per day (b/d) GTL plant would be 
constructed and operated utilizing ANS/Prudhoe Bay natural gas as the feedstock. 
There are two possible schemes for utilizing GTL to move the gas to market a 
location either on the North Slope or the South Shore.
If the production is commingled with ANS crude, then its unique nature would be 
lost and its value would be determined through a quality bank mechanism currently 
in place among all the various shippers of ANS crude in the TAPS line. Under a
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batching operation, the product would be kept segregated through the use of either 
cleaning pigs or a transmit buffer between the crude and GTL output.
A GTL plant constructed at the South Shore will require a gas supply pipeline to 
provide the feedstock to the plant. It will be located at the export loading point and 
will not require any special handling to keep product quality at its maximum. The 
costs of construction and operation at the South Shore are expected to be less than 
for the North Slope due to the less severe ambient conditions and unrestricted year- 
round access.
Comparable producer netbacks resulted for both cases because of the tradeoff 
between lower capital and higher gas pipeline cost of service for the South Shore 
versus higher capital cost and lower TAPS tariff for the North Slope.
Based on Purvin & Gertz' analysis, the North Slope GTL plant would have a slightly 
higher netback price to gas producers in the Prudhoe Bay area. Construction costs 
play an important role in the profitability of both cases.
An option builds infrastructure in Alaska that is independent of an Alaskan gas 
pipeline. Existing spare capacity on the TAPS pipeline would be used to transport 
diesel and naphtha in batches to the Valdez Marine Terminal on the South Shore. 
One drawback is the possibility of cutting short the economic life of this project if 
the TAPS tariff increases when North Slope crude oil production declines.
A recent study suggests the option of a combined tidewater LNG and GTL plant in 
southern Alaska. Such a combined project could increase the economies of scale for 
the pipeline across Alaska and lower the cost of service for both projects. The 
maximum benefits for the shared pipeline would be derived from the combination of 
the tidewater LNG and tidewater GTL. By increasing the pipeline capacity to 3.5 
bcfd from the North Slope (2.5 bcfd for a tidewater LNG and 1.0 bcfd for a 
tidewater GTL the competitiveness of both projects would be increased by the lower 
transportation cost). Although time did not permit the evaluation of this option, this
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option has merit for the development of North Slope natural gas and should be 
studied in detail to determine the impact on both projects. Additionally this option 
may provide an opportunity to develop a viable and smaller market entry LNG 
project.
2.1.5.5 Y-line Project
The Y-line project is a combination of an ALCAN and a Tidewater LNG 
project. In addition to the ALCAN line, there would be a spur line that takes 
volumes to Tidewater that could be marketed to various locations. The advantages 
are that it would provide significant construction and permanent jobs, would provide 
access to gas in Alaska, and could reap significant revenues for the State of 
Alaska. Also, over the potential thirty plus life of the line, gas could be delivered to 
where the best economics lie at various points in time. The disadvantages include a 
higher cost associated with the dual project, requiring quantities of gas of yet to be 
proven reserves in order to reach necessary economies of scale. Development in 
ANWR, along with other exploration efforts would likely solve this problem.
The Y-Line concept is based on the development of two gas projects that share a 
portion of the gas conditioning and transportation infrastructure. This cost sharing 
benefits both projects by allowing greater economies of scale for the first 541 miles 
from Prudhoe Bay to Delta Junction with separate pipelines beyond that point to 
both Valdez for tidewater LNG, and the Alberta/British Columbia border for the 
ALCAN highway project.
2.2 Monte Carlo Simulation and Its Application in Oil/Gas Industry
2.2.1 What is a Monte Carlo Simulation
A Monte Carlo simulation is a statistics-based analysis tool that yields probability vs. 
value relationships for key parameters. In the Oil/Gas exploration industry, key 
parameters include oil and gas reserves, capital cost, and various economic
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evaluation yardsticks, such as net present value (NPV) and return on investment 
(ROI). These probability relationships help the user answer such questions as “What 
is the probability that the NPV of this prospect will exceed the target of 
$1,500,000?” (Ref. 4)
Monte Carlo simulation is a part of risk analysis and is sometimes performed in 
conjunction with or as an alternative to decision tree analysis.
Monte Carlo simulation based on an economic model is used to quantify risks 
associated with a specific investment prospect. So we can define risk, a potential 
loss, or more generally, loss or gain (i.e., a change in assets associated with some 
chance occurrences). Hence, it helps the decision-maker chose the best prospect 
based on the decision-maker’s attitude about risk -  risk seeker, risk aversion, or risk 
neutral.
Monte Carlo simulation is an alternative to both single-point (deterministic) 
estimation and the scenario approach that presents worst, most likely, and best case 
scenarios. The term Monte Carlo dates back to the Manhattan Project in the 1940’s, 
where it was used as a code name for simulation of problems associated with 
development of the atomic bomb. Today, Monte Carlo techniques are applied to a 
wide variety of complex problems involving random behavior. For an early 
historical review, see Ref. 5.
2.2.2 How to Process a Monte Carlo Simulation
The following paragraph, drawn largely from Ref. 4, offers a brief description of the 
Monte Carlo process.
1. A Monte Carlo simulation begins with a model, with one or more equations, 
together with assumptions and logic relating the parameters in the equations.
2. Define all the input variables.
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3. Sort the input variables into two groups. Those variables whose values are 
known with certainty or reasonable precision and can be represented as 
single-point values (deterministic values). Significant unknowns will be 
represented as random variables for which exact values cannot be specified 
at the time of decision making (stochastic values).
4. Define distributions for the random input variables. Selecting Input 
Distributions. Input distributions can be themselves outputs from an 
economics model, the best available expert judgment, or best-fitting 
distribution curves obtained through historical data analysis.
5. Define correlation among inputs.
6. Define output. Usually, the output refers to the measure of value of interest 
to decision-maker, either Net Present Value (NPV) or Internal Rate of 
Return (IRR or ROR) of a prospected cash flow.
7. Run simulation. A trial consists of randomly selecting one value for each 
input and calculating the output. The aggregation of output for each trial 
generates a distribution of output, which generally has the approximate 
shape of a lognormal curve.
8. Prepare graphical displays of the evaluation model and results. The 
necessary displays are input variables distributions, output distribution—the 
histogram distribution or/and its equivalent cumulative frequency 
distribution converted from the histogram, and sensitivity chart (tornado 
chart). The cumulative distribution has the advantage of telling us 
probabilities at given levels of output (i.e. IRR) directly. The generated 
sensitivity chart is one of the byproducts of the simulation. A measure of 
significance toward a given output variable is calculated for each input 
variable, namely the (rank-order) correlation coefficient between the two 
parameters. When the correlation coefficient is close to 0, the output can
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achieve a value near the upper limit of its range. These coefficients can 
range from -1.0 to 1.0. The most significant parameter can be identified, and 
the others are ranked accordingly. For a complex model, sensitivity analysis 
identifies the “driving variables” that merit additional scrutiny and, by 
contrast, helps reduce effort wasted on worrying about the wrong things. 
Unlike the traditional tornado chart or spider diagrams obtained by tracking 
the changes in an output caused by allowing exactly one model input to vary 
while holding the others fixed, this sensitivity analysis from Monte Carlo 
simulation is far more versatile because it permits functional or correlation- 
type relationships among the inputs.
2.2.3 Correlation among Inputs (Dependency)
Unless otherwise specified, the samples of various input distributions are taken 
independent of one another. On a particular trial, a high level of price may be paired 
with a high level of cost (Consumer Price Index, CPI, might be driven up, causing 
operating cost increasing). If there is an argument (or empirical data) to justify a 
correlation between a pair of parameters, then the simulation software can honor 
that relationship. Correlation among inputs may cause the range of resulting output 
to become either wider or narrower. It depends on the economic model. And 
imposing correlations among inputs can also reorder the list of sensitive variables.
2.2.4 Monte Carlo Simulation Software — @RISK by Palisade Corp
@RISK is an advanced commercial risk analysis tool which adds directly in to 
Microsoft Excel. It performs risk analysis on spreadsheet using Monte Carlo 
simulation techniques. Risk Analysis in @RJSK is a quantitative method that seeks 
to determine the outcomes of a decision situation as a probability distribution.
In general, the techniques in an @RISK risk analysis encompass four steps:
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• Developing a Model -  by defining a problem or a situation in Excel 
worksheet format.
• Identifying Uncertainty -  by taking variables in an Excel worksheet and 
specifying their possible values with probability distributions, and 
identifying the uncertain worksheet results you want analyzed.
• Analyzing the Model with Simulation -  by determining the range and 
probabilities of all possible outcomes for the results of your worksheet.
• Making a Decision -  by displaying the results for personal preferences.
You can simply replace uncertain values in your existing spreadsheet with @risk 
probability distribution functions that represent a range of possible values. Then, 
select output cells -  the bottom-line cells whose values you are interested in -  and 
simulate. @RISK gives you distributions of possible outcomes, including the 
probabilities that they will occur. This not only tells you what could happen in a 
risky situation, but helps you discover the crucial scenarios to encourage or avoid.
2.2.5 Sampling Method Offered by @RISK
Sampling is the processes by which values are randomly drawn from input 
probability distributions. Probability distributions are represented in @RISK by 
probability distribution functions and sampling is performed by the @RISK 
program. Sampling in a simulation is done repetitively with one sample drawn for 
every iteration from each input probability distribution. With enough iterations, the 
sampled values for a probability distribution become distributed in a manner which 
approximates the known input probability distribution. The statistics of the sampled 
distribution (mean, standard deviation and higher moments) approximate the true 
statistics input for the distribution. The graph of the sampled distribution will even 
look like a graph of the true input distribution.
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@RISK offers two sampling functions, Monte Carlo sampling and Latin Hypercube 
sampling. Before running simulation, the pop-up Simulation Settings Menu will not 
only ask you to specify the number of iterations you want, but also chose the 
sampling method. The @RISK User’s Guide recommends using Latin Hypercube, 
the default sampling type setting, unless the modeling situation specifically calls for 
Monte Carlo sampling. The technical details on each sampling type are presented in 
the Technical Appendices of @RISK User’s Guide, Ref. 6.
Monte Carlo sampling is a traditional way to sample data. With Monte Carlo 
sampling, we use a random number generator to generate a uniform distribution 
along the cumulative probability axis. However, the randomness of random numbers 
cause the data we generated to be non-uniformly distributed, some values will 
appear to be “clustered” together, where elsewhere there appear to be gaps when a 
small number of iterations are performed. Monte Carlo sampling often requires a 
large number of samples to approximate an input distribution, especially if the input 
distribution is highly skewed or has some outcomes of low probability.
Latin Hypercube Sampling (LHS) is a stratified sampling method. It was invented in 
the late 1970s, started appearing in the petroleum literature in the 1980s, and 
became routine in the 1990s (Ref. 1). It is a combination of conventional Monte 
Carlo sampling and uniform sampling. The key to LHS is stratification of the input 
probability distributions. Stratification divides the cumulative curve into equal 
intervals on the cumulative probability scale (0 to 1.0). A sample is then randomly 
taken from each interval of the input distribution. Sampling is forced to represent 
values in each interval, and thus, is forced to recreate the input probability 
distribution. LHS greatly reduces the number of trials needed to achieve a desired 
level of precision in the simulation. From experimentation, the typical convergence 
using LHS is about 10 times better than with conventional Monte Carlo sampling 
(Ref. 1).
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LHS is always a recommended sampling method even though @RISK provides the 
choice between using conventional Monte Carlo Sampling or LHS.
2.2.6 What Monte Carlo Simulation Does Not Do
In the paper “Monte Carlo Simulation: Its Status and Future”, Ref. 4, Murtha did a 
good summarization of the function of Monte Carlo Simulation, which we need to 
keep in mind when we do risk analysis using Monte Carlo simulation.
“In spite of its power and applicability, Monte Carlo simulation does not do the 
following.
1. It does not make decisions; it prepares for decision making.
2. It does not analyze data; there is companion software for that purpose.
3. It does not optimize functions; the output distributions serves as ingredients 
for optimization
4. It does not provide ready—made models; everyone builds their own.”
No matter how powerful a tool is, it is still a tool. How it works depends upon how 
we use it.
2.2.7 Applications of Monte Carlo Simulation in Oil or Gas Industry
In Ref. 4, four typical problems in Oil or Gas industry using Monte Carlo 
Simulation are introduced. Taken as a whole, they suggest a process of integrating 
risk analysis.
1. Volumetric-reserves Model
Here is an example of Volumetric-reserves model:
N = 7,75 SAJip( 1 -Sw)/B0
Where, N -  oil in place;
A -  area;
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h -  net pay;
p  -  porosity;
Sw -  water saturation;
and Bo -  formation volume factor.
Think of A, h, p, Sw, and B0 as input parameters and N as the output. Each input 
parameter can be viewed as a random variable; it satisfies some probability vs. 
cumulative-value relationship. After simulation, a succession of hundreds or 
thousands of repeated trials, during which the output values are stored in a file in 
the computer memory, the output value, oil in place, are grouped into a 
histogram or cumulative distribution function.
2. Drilling Authorization for Expenditure (AFE): Estimate Total Costs and 
Times and Other Cost-Estimation Models
Drilling AFE estimators are prime candidates for Monte Carlo simulation, being 
conceptually simple, ubiquitous, and essential to the overall prospect evaluation 
process. One task for the user is to estimate durations for various activities, such 
as drilling the hole sections, completing, and testing. Another task is to estimate 
line-item costs. One way is to provide two values for each estimate: a low and a 
high estimate. A preliminary calculation in the worksheet solves some simple 
equations to obtain the mean and standard deviation for a lognormal distribution 
for that cost or time category. These high and low estimates are treated as P10 
and P90: the actual value has a 10% chance of being less than the low value and 
a 10% chance of exceeding the high value. And also, we can use P5 and P95. 
Because the input parameters represent times and costs, they are generally 
regarded as skewed right: there are more extreme values to the right of the mode 
than to the left, causing a tail of large values having low probability of 
occurrence.
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The proper role for the drilling AFE is a preliminary step to more 
comprehensive models. The outputs (total time and costs) can be reported as a 
distribution or a series of distributions over time or for each of several wells. In 
cases where there are multiple wells or drilling costs along with facilities costs, 
care must be taken to transmit the correlations between the relevant distributions.
Also, we can include other simple spreadsheet line-item models, similar to the 
drilling AFE, such as pipelines, platforms, and other facilities in the Monte 
Carlo economics model. When schedule details are paramount, a project- 
scheduling model is necessary. Palisade supplies @RISK 4.0 for Project for risk 
analysis in project management. It would be a faster and easier way to analyze 
schedule and cost risk.
3. Field-Development Program: To Estimate Production and Revenue Streams
Field-Development program starts with a deterministic forecast of oil production, 
generated by exponential-decline model. Consider both of the initial rate of 
production and the decline rate as probability distributions, because we do not 
know exactly how much oil will be produced in the first year and how sharply 
the production will decline from one year to the next. Assume some distribution 
for the capital cost of drilling and completing the well. This distribution comes 
from the drilling engineers who model the AFE simulators. Further assume that 
operating costs can be described in terms of probability distributions. Operating 
expense and oil production can be correlated. Finally, the discounted cash flow 
for some time horizon (e.g., 20 years) can be generated.
The output distributions of this model are the requisite input distributions for 
portfolio-optimization models. There are forecasts of aggregate field production 
by type, cash flows, measured by NPV or ROI, and capital and operating 
expense. The usefulness of this model is obvious. One can estimate the 
probability of achieving some hurdle rate for ROI or of failing to meet a target
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NPV. The sensitivity analysis highlights the input parameters that drive the 
model and alerts investors to opportunities to reduce the risks.
4. Strategic Plan: Estimate Reserve Increases, NPV, and Capital Exposure
The objective of strategic plan is to aggregate various capital investments 
(ventures) making up a portfolio. Each investment is represented by 
distributions for capital, reserves, and NPV. On each trial of the simulation, 
samples are taken from number of discoveries for each venture, along with 
corresponding reserves, NPV’s, and capital exposures (both exploration and 
development). Outputs are the aggregations of these parameters. Aggregation 
models rely on good input distributions and any correlations between them. 
These input distributions are themselves outputs from an exploration economics 
model.
Virtually all segments of the industry -  operating companies, service companies, 
consulting firms, and financial institutions -  are engaged in some form of risk 
analysis. At this time, it appears that no oil and gas operating company has a fully 
implemented, unified program to do probabilistic estimates of their key operating 
parameters: reserves, capital exposure, and NPV. A few have made efforts in this 
direction. The efforts on risk analysis of the petroleum exploration industry 
sometimes date back to the 1970’s, some even further. Ref.4 mentions articles and 
books on Monte Carlo simulation and related topics in the petroleum literature. 
Those literatures represent the early efforts in industry on risk analysis.
2.2.8 Model Shortcomings
Extracting one or a few numbers from the reserve distribution to “run economics,” 
treating well productivity and capital costs as deterministic, this approach reduces 
the effectiveness of the uncertainty analysis, although it is a widespread practice. 
This method may be good for a field-development model. For an exploration- 
prospect model, an integrating risk-analysis, which include scoping estimates for
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production forecasts and both capital and operating expenses, will help us 
identifying the relative importance of the various risks involved in an exploration 
prospect. Questions, such as how does field-size uncertainty compare with the 
uncertainty of the capital costs or the productivity of the wells; Where should we 
invest additional resources to acquire information; What are the key issues when 
negotiating with partners or forming alliances, may be easier to be answer.
2.3 Energy Bill S. 1766
Energy Bill S. 1766, the Energy Policy Act of 2002, was introduced by Senate 
majority leader Tom Daschle and Senator Jeff Bingaman on December 5, 2001. The 
Sec. 700, Alaska Natural Gas Pipeline Act of 2002, addresses the purposes of this 
subtitle:
(1) to expedite the approval, construction , and initial operation of one or more
transportation systems for the delivery of Alaska natural gas to the
contiguous United States;
(2) to ensure access to such transportation systems on an equal and
nondiscriminatory basis and to promote competition in the exploration,
development and production of Alaska Natural Gas;
(3) to provide federal financial assistance to any transportation system for the 
transport of Alaska natural gas to the contiguous United States, for which 
an application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity is filed 
with the Commission not later than six months after the date of enactment 
of this title.
The “commodity risk” amendment of S. 1766, offered on April 22, 2002 by Sen. 
Frank Murkowski, would allow investors in the estimated $15 billion to $20 billion 
gas line project to take a federal tax credit if gas prices at the AECO (Alberta 
Energy Co.) trading hub in Alberta fall below a certain level. This amendment was 
adopted by the U.S. Senate unanimously on April 23, 2002.
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The commodity risk provision in the Energy Bill is very important to help a North 
Slope gas pipeline attract financing. Senator Murkowski described the provision of 
commodity risk is a “true win-win”. “The nation will benefit because the increased 
supplies of this clean-buming fuel will provide an affordable energy product for 
American families and allow for expanded uses of new technology at the same 
time,” Murkowski said. “Alaska communities will benefit from the construction 
jobs and access to natural gas that will fuel their future energy needs. And in the end, 
because of the payback provision, it won’t cost the federal government a penny.”
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3 THE EFFECT OF PRICE CREDIT 
3.1 Introduction
The profit margin of Alaska Natural Gas Pipeline Project is very sensitive to the 
market price of natural gas. The price risk involved in Alaska natural gas 
development makes no producer would like to develop gas field and build a $15 
billion to $20 billion gas pipeline without government incentives.
The tax mechanism proposed in Senate Energy Bill S. 1766 is a simple device to 
increase the expected return on the Alaska Gas Pipeline and lower certain market- 
price related risks. The credit is available only if gas prices fall below a 
government-set floor, which would be trigged when average monthly prices at 
Alberta’s benchmark AECO gas pipeline hub fall below $3.25/MMBtu, and if 
prices rise above a ceiling, it would be paid back when prices exceed $4.85/MMbtu.
The purpose of this study is to analyze the effect of Federal Tax Credit, which 
shows how well the project ROI would improve with the tax credit involved, by 
using risk analysis method.
In the risk model, the input, natural gas price, is the distribution of historical prices 
at AECO gas pipeline hub. And the output, ROI, is generated by the Monte Carlo 
simulation.
3.2 Base Case
Alberta Gas Price: $2.60mmBtu 
ROI (nominal): 16.28%
For comparing purpose, the information of base case is shown here. The base case 
calculated at Alberta gas price level $2.60mmBtu generate nominal ROI 16.28%.
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3.3 Simulation Based on Historic Prices
In the risk model, we consider that the input, Alberta gas price, will follow the 
lognormal distribution as shown in Figure 3-2. This is the best-fit distribution 
generated by @risk software based on the historical AECO Prices from 1993 
through 2001.
Before generated best-fit distribution, the real historical prices from 1993 through 
2001 of Alberta gas were adjusted in 2002 US Dollars by using the 2002 GDP 
Implicit Price Deflator, which was translated from the 1996 GDP Implicit Price 
Deflator published on EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook (October 2001 )6.
Table 3-1 shows the published GDP Implicit Price Deflator and its adjustment.
Table 3-1: 1996 GDP Implicit Price Deflator and Adjustment
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
1996 Price 
Deflator 94.1 96.0 98.1 100.0 102.0 103.2 104.8 106.9 109.4 111.5
2002 Price 
Deflator 84.4 86.1 88.0 89.7 91.5 92.6 94.0 95.9 98.1 100.0
Sources: 1996 Price Deflator is available from EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook, October 2001
Figure 3-1 shows the time series graph of the adjusted historical natural gas prices.
6 GDP Implicit Price Deflator (Index, 1996=1.000) is published on Table A2. Annual U.S. 
Macroeconomic and Weather Indicators, Energy Information Administration/Short-Term Energy 
Outlook, October 2001.
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Adjusted Historical Natural Gas Prices
Time
-— Real AECO Price (2002)
Figure 3-1: Adjusted Historical Natural Gas Prices -  Time Series
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Figure 3-2: Fit Distribution for Historic Natural Gas Price
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3.4 Simulation Result
In this study, risk simulation has been done to analyze the effect of the price credit 
supposed to be employed in Alaska Natural Gas Pipeline Development. Table 3-2 
shows the summary of simulation results based on historical prices.
Table 3-2: Summary of Simulation Results (Based on Historical Prices)
Base Case
Simulation Based on 
Historical Prices 
(without Price Credit)
Simulation Based on 
Historical Prices 
(with Price Credit)
File Name UAFNG3.0.1.xls UAF NG 3.1.xls UAFNG3.L2.xls
Alberta Price 2.60$/MMBtu
Distribution for AECO 
Historical Prices (1993- 
2001)
Lognorm( 1.4000,1.5075) 
Shift = +0.67665
Distribution for AECO 
Historical Prices (1993- 
2001)
Lognorm( 1.4000,1.5075) 
Shift = +0.67665
Distribution for 
ROI (Nominal) 16.28%
Mean = 13.32% 
S.D. = 5.65%
Mean = 20.19% 
S.D. = 2.11%
90%
Confidence
Interval
6.87%~23.76% 16.74%~23.01%
90% Range 16.89% 6.27%
Risk Greater
As shown in Table 3-2, the ROI7 of Base Case is 16.28% when Alberta gas is 
$2.6/MMBtu (no price risk involved case).
When we consider price risk by setting the price possibility distribution based on 
historical natural gas prices (Figure 3-2), we get the ROI 90% confidence interval 
6.87%~23.76% with a mean of 13.32% (Figure 3-3). With the price credit involved 
in the simulation model, the simulation result shows a great increase in mean value 
and confidence interval (90% confidence interval: 16.74%~23% with a mean of
7 ROI means the rate of return for investment. It is used to express the internal rate of return of a 
project when the project has 100 percent equity.
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20.19%), as shown in Figure 3-4, and the relatively narrow range. We can see that 
the price risk involved in Alaska Gas Pipeline Project decreases significantly with 
the Federal Tax Credit (Price Credit), and the return to producers would be much 
higher than what we might get without the price credit. As shown in Table 3-2, the 
tax credit could add 3-6 percent to the rate of return on this gas pipeline project.
Distribution for ROI (Nominal)
(based on historical AECO price distribution)
X <=0.068732 X <=0.237598
12 5% 95%
10 
8 
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0
0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.45
Figure 3-3: Simulation Result (without Price Credit)
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Distribution for ROI (Nominal)
(based on historical AECO price distribution with Price Credit)
X <=0.tS7401 X <=0.230064
Figure 3-4: Simulation Result (with Price Credit)
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4 PRICE CREDIT SIMULATION
4.1 Introduction
Also, risk analysis can be done based on EIA projected natural gas prices for the 
period 2010-2020. As shown in Table 4-1, EIA published three series projection 
prices within the last two years. The most recent projection is from June 2002, 
which indicates a much higher price prospect than what the ELA published in its 
previous forecasts (Figure 4-1).
Table 4-1: EIA Projected NG Prices
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Forecast, May 2001 2.69 2.71 2.73 2.76 2.79 2.83 2.88 2.93 2.98 3.05 3.13
Forecast, Dec 2001 2.85 2.91 2.97 3.01 3.03 3.07 3.09 3.13 3.17 3.20 3.26
Forecast, June 2002 3.27 3.31 3.32 3.32 3.31 3.35 3.41 3.50 3.58 3.63 3.65
In real 2000 dollar
Average Lower 48 Wellhead Price, EIA
C N C N C M C N I C M C M C N I C N C M C M C M C N C N C s l C N C N C N C N C N C N C N
 Forecast, Dec 2001  Forecast, May 2001 Forecast, June 2002
Figure 4-1: EIA NG Price Projection
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This study is done mainly based on the last EIA forecast (June 2002). For 
comparison purpose, the other two projections are put into risk model as well.
4.2 Adjusted EIA Forecast Prices for AECO Prices
The differences between cash prices at various locations around the country are 
related to transportation costs, prevailing product flows, and the supply-and-demand 
situation in each local market. Arbitrage possibilities assure that the price 
differences at different locations bear a reasonably stable relationship to each other. 
This makes it possible for us to adjust EIA forecast prices to AECO-EIA prices. 
What we need to know are the price differences among EIA Prices, Henry Hub 
prices, and Alberta AECO prices. Some research for those price differences is 
available.
Before we put the forecast prices into a risk model, a necessary adjustment should 
be done. Here the calculations are shown:
Henry Hub Price = EIA Price + $0.21
AECO Price = HH Price -  $0.50
Where, $0.21 is the average value difference between HH Price and EIA Wellhead 
Price for the period from November 1993 through December 2001.
o
$0.50 is the transportation cost of natural gas between AECO and Henry Hub .
And then, adjusted for inflation at an inflation rate of 2%9.
The nominal prices are from the series calculations shown above and are the mean 
value of price projected for the associated year. Normal distribution function for the 
price of each year was assigned in the economic evaluation model. This function has
8 Source of data: CAPP (Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers) website presentations.
9 The average GDP deflator over the last 10 years is rounded to 2%.
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a mean of projected gas price and a standard deviation of $0.75MMBtu10. The 
distribution function looks like this: NORMAL (AECO-EIA forecast, 0.75).
4.3 Simulation Result
Table 4-2 shows the summary of price credit simulation results based on EIA 
forecast prices.
Table 4-2: Summary of Price Credit Simulation Results Based on EIA Forecast______________
Base EIA June 2002 Forecast
EIA Dec 2001 
Forecast
EIA May 2001 
Forecast
File Name UAF NG 3-2.xls UAF NG 3.2.1.xls UAF NG 3.2.2.xls
Forecast Model 
(used to forecast 
gas prices from 
2021-2039)
Y = 0.1494 Ln(X) + 
2.9843 
R2 = 0.9918
Y = 2.6419e001438 
R2 = 0.9901
Y = 2.4151e°023 
R2 = 0.9904
Distribution for 
ROI
Mean = 18.25% 
S.D. = 0.37%
Mean = 18.17% 
S.D. = 0.41%
Mean = 18.33% 
S.D. = 0.44%
90% Confidence 
Interval 17.66%~18.77% 17.55%—18.88% 17.63%~19.08%
90% Range 1.11% 1.33% 1.45%
As shown in Table 4-2, the simulation results we got based on three different 
projections have no big differences. The mean of ROI is around 18.2%, and the 
range of 90% confidence interval is only about 1.3%.
As shown in the literature review 2.4, Murkowski claim that because of the payback 
provision, the Federal Tax Credit on the potential Alaska natural gas pipeline won’t 
cost the federal government a penny. Is this true? Not necessary. The simulation 
results do not support this option.
10 The normal distribution of the yearly natural gas historical data has a standard distribution around 
$0.75MMBtu.
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Table 4-3 shows the expected tax credits and tax recaptures generated by Monte 
Carlo simulation based on different EIA forecast as well as historical natural gas 
price. The expected Tax credits are always higher than the expected tax recapture 
under whatever EIA forecasts. The result goes even worse when the simulation ran 
based on the historical price data. The best-fit distribution of historical natural gas 
prices from 1993 through 2001 is a lognormal distribution which is skew right. It 
means that the possibility of having a lower price is much higher than having a 
higher price, which has the same deviation away from mean. In another words, we 
might meet more low gas prices than high gas prices during the life periods of 
Alaska natural gas pipeline according to the natural gas price history. It is likely that 
the Federal Government might give more credit than receive recapture during the 
project life time.
Table 4-3: Summary of the Expected Tax Credit and Tax Recapture
Simulation Result 
($million)
Based on EIA 
Forecast June 
2002
Based on EIA 
Forecast Dec 
2001
Based on EIA 
Forecast May 
2001
Based on 
Historical 
Price
Expected Tax 
Credit 2,659 6,344 8,807 59,263
Expected Tax 
Recapture 2,363 2,209 6,338 15,687
Notice that the expected tax credit/recapture calculation in this study was based on 
the assumption that the standard deviation of a normal distribution for a yearly price 
forecast is 0.75. We suggest that a future analysis can look at tax credit/recapture as 
higher and lower variances are put into a risk model.
The following Figures show the details of prices forecast, and simulation results 
made based on the EIA forecast June 2002. For details of results calculated based on 
other two forecasts, see Appendix A and B.
44
Adjusted Forecast for AECO Prices
(based on EIA forecast June 2002)
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Figure 4-2: Adjusted AECO Prices Based on EIA Forecast June 2002
The price adjustments result is shown in Figure 4-2. Only the forecast prices from 
2010 through 2020 are available in EIA’s Natural Gas Outlook. Therefore, the 
prices from 2021 through 2039 are forecasted based on the trend of the last 5-year 
period of the EIA forecast price, which is from 2016 through 2020. The best-fit 
trend was used to predict future prices. In this case, the best-fit trend is a LN model. 
Notice that the LN model means that the tendency of price increasing would be 
relatively smooth while compared with EXP model.
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Distribution for Project ROI (Nominal)
(based on EIA forecast June 2002 )
X <=0.176574 X<=0.B8773
Figure 4-3: Distribution for Project ROI Based on EIA Forecast June 2002
The output distributions for the price changes during the production period 
summarize the price volatility and uncertainty of the project. Figure 4-3 shows the 
output (ROI) by probability density functions (PDF’s) in histogram format.
Figure 4-3 shows the stimulation result based on EIA June 2002 forecast that there 
is 90% chance that the project ROI will be in 17.66% ~18.78% range with a mean 
value of 18.25%.
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Gas Price Incom e Tax  Credit M echanism -Yearly  
500 Iterations Sim ulation
(based on EIA forecast June 2002)
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Figure 4-4: Tax Credit Yearly Simulation Based on EIA Forecast June 2002
Figure 4-4 shows the yearly simulation of prices turbulence (a trial of Monte Carlo 
sampling price picked from a total of 500 iterations) around AECO-EIA forecast 
and the possible price credits and price recaptures for each year.
The middle red line represents the AECO-EIA forecast; the upper blue line 
represents the price credit ceiling; and the lower grey line represents the price credit 
floor. The bars show the average value of 500 iterations for price credits and 
recaptures government will give and obtain for each year.
The price credit stimulation run based on the EIA June 2002 forecast shows that the 
likelihood of credit payments is smaller than for other simulations based on previous 
EIA forecasts. However, in the first several years of production period, the chances 
of getting price credits is pretty high, and the specific credit given and received 
situation depends on the trend of prices forecast. See Appendix A and B for the 
simulation results based on other EIA forecasts.
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Figure 4-5: Tax Credit Monthly Simulation Based on EIA Forecast June 2002
Figure 4-5 shows the monthly simulation of prices turbulence around AECO-EIA 
forecast by picking a trial of Monte Carlo sampling prices from a total of 500 
iterations. The middle red line represents the AECO-EIA forecast; the upper blue 
line represents the price credit ceiling; and the lower grey line represents the price 
credit floor.
4.4 Conclusion
Federal Tax Credit on Alaska natural gas pipeline project might not be revenue 
neutral for the Federal Government.
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5 Y-LINE CASE VS. ALCAN ONLY CASE 
5.1 Introduction
In this study, two gas pipeline project alternatives are analyzed to see which one is 
more risky according to price risk. These two alternatives are embraced currently by 
the State of Alaska, because both of them would provide more Alaskan construction 
and permanent jobs than any other routes had been considered. One is “ALCAN 
Only” project, also known as “ALCAN Highway” project, which would transport 
natural gas from the North Slope of Alaska to Alberta, Canada along with ALCAN 
Highway, then to Chicago. And it is thought to be economical from an overall 
investment perspective, depending upon market conditions. The other is called the 
“Y-line” project, which combines LNG and ALCAN Highway routines. In addition 
to the ALCAN line, there would be a spur line that takes volumes to Tidewater that 
could be marketed to various locations.
As our only concern here is price risk, three prices in model were treated as 
uncertain variables: AECO price was set based on EIA forecast; Propane price and 
world oil price are assigned distributions generated from historical data.
5.2 Price Distribution
The next three figures show distributions of input prices of the Alaska Natural Gas 
Pipeline economic model. They are a natural gas price forecast, a propane price 
distribution, and an oil price distribution.
To impose uncertainty on natural gas prices, a distribution function 
NORMAL(AECO-EIA forecast, 0.75) was introduced. This function can add some 
noise to the forecast prices. The adjusted forecast for AECO price and its future 
trend is shown in Figure 5-1.
Figure 5-2 shows an example of natural gas price distribution in a typical year -  the 
distribution for natural gas price in 2011. It is a result of stratified sampling (500
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iterations) generating from a function -  Normal (3.60, 0.75). The $3.60/MMBtu is 
the adjusted EIA forecast of natural gas price (nominal price) in 2011.
The historical data analysis shows that the distribution of Propane prices follows the 
lognormal function as shown in Figure 5-3. And the historical distribution of world 
oil prices follows the lognormal function as shown in Figure 5-4. Using the best-fit 
function of the Excel add-in tool @RISK generated these two prices distributions.
Adjusted Forecast for AECO Prices
(based on EIA forecast June 2002)
3.60
3.40
y = 0.1494Ln(x) + 2.9843
R2 = 0.9918
g 2.60 -
£  2.40
2.20
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-♦— Adjusted Real AECO Price Based on EIA Forecast Real AECO Forecast Rice
Figure 5-1: Future NG Price Trend
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Distribution for NG Price (2011)
Generating by the Stratified Sampling (500 Iterations) 
Normal(3.62587, 0.75469)
X<= 2.3845
From the function: Normal (3.60, 0.75)
Figure 5-2: Sampled Distribution for NG Price (2011)
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Figure 5-3: Distribution for Historical Propane Price
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Distribution for World Oil Price
Lognorm(18.960, 5.1547) Shift=+1.7437
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Figure 5-4: Distribution for Historical World Oil Price 
5.3 Correlations among Input Variables
Before running simulations, historical data analysis had been done to determine the 
relationship among input variables. The correlations in Table 5-1 were calculated 
from real set of yearly data for a period of nine years from 1993 to 2001.The Table 
5-1 shows the correlations among input variables, propane price, crude oil price, and 
natural gas price. The correlation between oil price and propane price is very high, 
about 0.95. The correlation between natural gas price and oil price, and the 
correlation between natural gas price and propane price are relatively low, only 
around 0.60.
In this study, only the correlation between propane price and crude oil price, 0.95, 
was considered in the simulation model.
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Table 5-1: Correlation Matrix of Input Variables
Real Propane 
Price
Real World 
Oil Price
Real AECO 
Price
Real Propane Price 1
Real World Oil Price 0.95 1
Real AECO Price 0.62 0.67 1
In 2002 US Dollars
5.4 Simulation Result
Table 5-2 summarizes the simulation results of Y-line case and ALCAN Only case. 
The probability distribution for Y-line Case represents greater risk than the ALCAN 
Only Case despite the fact that the Y-line has a smaller range of variability. The 
range of the variability of the Y-line includes less desirable results, even though it 
has a relatively narrow 90% confidence range. The ROI distribution of the Y-line is 
narrower than the ALCAN Only due to the 20 year contract of LNG. The ALCAN 
Only case is desirable economically because the Y-line case has a higher cost 
associated with the dual project. In a technical dimension, this project also requires 
quantities of gas reserves that have yet to be proven in order to reach the necessary 
economies of scale. Development in ANWR, along with other exploration efforts 
would likely solve this problem.
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Table 5-2: Summary of Y-line Case vs. ALCAN Only Case
Y- line ALCAN Only
File Name UAF NG 4.0 UAF NG 3.1.1
Capital Cost $22,663million $13,151million
Production 6.0Bcf/day 4.5Bcl7day
Result of Base Case (ROI) 14.13% 16.28%
Distribution for ROI Mean=14.8% S.D. = 0.28%
Mean=17.7% 
S.D. = 0.68%
90% Confidence Interval 14.4%~15.2% 16.8%—18.7%
90% Range 0.8% 1.9%
75% Confidence Interval 14.5%~15.1% 17.0%~18.4%
Risk Greater
Figure 5-5 shows the simulation result for the Y-line Case. This is a histogram 
which shows the 90% confidence interval of ROI for the Y-line case is from 14.4% 
to 15.2% with a mean of 14.8%. It indicates that we have 90% confidence that the 
ROI of the Y-line Case will in 14.4% to 15.2% range, and the average level of ROI 
for 500 iterations simulation is 14.8%.
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Distribution for ROI (Nominal)
Y-line Case
X <=0.144 X <=0.f>2
Figure 5-5: Simulation Result for Y-line Case
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Figure 5-6 shows the accumulative curve of the Y-line Case. It tells us the 75% 
confidence interval of the ROI for the Y-line case is from 14.5% to 15.1% with a 
mean of 14.8%. It indicates that we have 75% confidence that the ROI of the Y-line 
Case will be in 14.5% to 15.1% range, and the average level of ROI for 500 
iterations simulation is 14.8%.
Distribution for ROI (Nominal)
Y-line Case
0.138 0.1425 0.147 0.1515 0.156
Figure 5-6: Simulation Result for Y-line Case— Accumulative Curve
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Figure 5-7 shows the simulation result for the ALCAN Only Case. This histogram 
figure shows the 90% confidence interval of ROI for the ALCAN Only case is from 
16.8% to 18.7% with a mean of 17.7%. It indicates that we have 90% confidence 
that the ROI of the ALCAN Only case will be in 16.8% to 18.7% range, and the 
average level of ROI for 500 iterations simulation is 17.7%.
Distribution for ROI (Nominal)
ALCAN Only Case
X<=0.B8 X<=0.'B7
Figure 5-7: Simulation Result for ALCAN Only Case
Figure 5-8 shows the accumulative curve of the Y-line Case. It tells us the 75% 
confidence interval of ROI for the Y-line case is from 17.0% to 18.4% with a mean 
of 17.7%. It indicates that we have 75% confidence that the ROI of the Y-line case 
will be in 17.0% to 18.4% range, and the average level of ROI for 500 iterations 
simulation is 17.7%.
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Distribution for ROI (Nominal)
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Figure 5-8: Simulation Result for ALCAN Only Case— Accumulative Curve
A tornado chart is a good way to determine the effect of each variable in a specific 
prospect. The variables listed at the bottom of the graph are the least important.
Figure 5-9 and Figure 5-10 show the results of sensitivity analysis for the Y-line 
Case and the ALCAN Only Case. The common sense for both of them is that the 
most recent price will be the most important and sensitive factor in the pipeline 
economic model. We can simply rank the sensitivity of every year’s natural gas 
price by the year it will happen. We can also tell that for the propane, the effect on 
pipeline economic model depends upon its production against total production ratio 
of this pipeline.
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Regression Sensitivity for ROi (Nominal)
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Figure 5-9: Tornado Chart for Y-line Case
Regression Sensitivity for ROI (Nominal)
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Figure 5-10: Tornado Chart for ALCAN Only Case
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Oil price has a negative effect on ROI because we consider “oil lost” in our model. 
If a field produces gas to profit in the gas market, then the gas cannot be re-inject 
into oil wells to produce oil anymore. That creates a certain amount of oil lost due to 
this change.
We can draw a conclusion that the ALCAN Only Case is better than the Y-line Case. 
It is because:
1. The mean of ROI of the ALCAN Only Case is better than the Y-line Case.
2. The ALCAN Only Case generates higher ROI in any confidence level than 
the Y-line Case.
Therefore, even if risk-averse, we still would prefer the ALCAN Only Case.
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6 5.5 BCF/DAY CASE
6.1 Introduction
A 5.5 Bcf/day production Project was developed to compare with the 4.5 Bcf/day 
Case (the ALCAN Only Case), in case of there are more gas source found in the 
coming future. 5.5 Bcf/day Project supposes that the production will increase from
4.5 billion/day to 5.5 Bcf/day in 2013.
There are two models for the 5.5 Bcf/day project. One is to use the old model with 
the higher thought output, i.e. 5.5 Bcf/day, called the “Build Large” model. In this 
model, the designed pipeline diameter changes from 49” to 54” for the additional
1.0 Bcf/day production. Thus the initial capital investment will increase to $14,773 
million. These calculations were made automatically by the build-in formula in the 
economic model, where the pipeline diameter associates with the pipeline 
transportation capacity and the initial capital cost associates with the pipeline 
diameter.
The other is to use a 4.5 Bcf/day model and add compressor stations, called the 
“Compressor” model. For increasing transportation capacity from 4.5 Bcf/day to 5.5 
Bcf/day in 2013, compressor stations will be built in 2012. Thus the initial capital 
investment may keep at $13,151 million, and there is a capital investment at amount 
of $1,500 million in 2012.
For the consideration shown above, we compared two cases in this study, the Build 
Large Case and the Compressor Case. As shown in Table 6-1, the production of 
these two cases is same, 4.5bcf/day from 2010 through 2012, and the production 
will achieve 5.5bcf/day in 2013. The differences of these two cases are capital 
investment and construction schedule. The Build Large Case has initial capital cost 
$14,773 million. This amount of money will be invested during the four-year 
construction period from 2006 through 2009. The Compressor Case has $13,151 
million initial capital cost invests in the four-year construction period, and then
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$1,500 million will be invested for compressor stations for increasing the pipeline 
transportation capacity to 5.5bclMay.
Table 6-1: Inputs Comparison
Build Large Compressor
Capital Cost $14,773 million (2006-2009)
$13,151million 
(2006-2009) 
$l,500million (2012)
Production 4.5 Bcf/day (2010-2012)5.5 Bcf/day (2013-2039) Same
Natural Gas Price
A normal distribution with a 
mean of Adjusted Yearly EIA 
Forecast and a standard 
deviation of 0.75.
Same
Propane Price Lognormal distribution from historical data Same
World Oil Price Lognormal distribution from historical data Same
Suppose we believe that the capital investment of the compressor stations in 2012 
has a triangular distribution with a minimum of $1,000 million, a mean of $1,500 
million, and a maximum value of $2,000 million. Figure 6-1 shows the probability 
distribution of the capital cost of compressor stations based on our assumption.
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Distribution for capex.comp 
Triang(1000,1500,2000)
5.5 Billion/day Case (Compressor)
X <=1147.84 X <=1358.45
Values in Thousands
Figure 6-1: Triangle Distribution for the Investment of Compressor Stations 
6.2 Simulation Result
Table 6-2 shows the summary of simulation result for the 5.5 Bcf/day Project. We 
would prefer Compressor Case because it has higher ROI and it is more flexible. It 
allows the 4.5 Bcf/day project developing to the more profitable 5.5 Bcf/day project 
when new gas source found in the future. Because we can add Compressor Stations 
whenever it is necessary, there would be no risk of wasting pipeline capacity.
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Table 6-2: Summary of 5.5 Billion/day Case
Build Large Compressor
File Name UAFNG3.3 UAF NG 3.3.1
Capital Cost $14,773million $ 13,151 +$ 1,500million
Production 5.5Bcf/day 5.5Bcf/day
Distribution for ROI Mean=17.75% S.D. = 0.58%
Mean= 19.40% 
S.D. = 0.66%
90% Confidence Interval 16.80%~18.75% 18.37%~20.57%
90% Range 1.95% 2.20%
75% Confidence Interval 17.07%~ 18.40% 18.66%~20.18%
Risk Greater
Notices that the total capital cost of two cases have no big difference. The economic 
analysis shows the Compressor Case is better, because the scale of initial investment 
has greater effect on the project net present cash flow.
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Figure 6-2 shows the simulation result for the Build Large Case. This is a histogram 
which shows the 90% confidence interval of ROI for the Build Large Case is from 
16.8% to 18.8% with a mean of 17.7%. It indicates that we have 90% confidence 
that the ROI of the Pipeline Build Large Case will be in 16.8% to 18.8% range, and 
the average level of ROI for 500 iterations simulation is 17.7%.
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Figure 6-2: Simulation Result for 5.5 Billion/day Case (Build Large)
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Figure 6-3 shows the accumulative curve of the Build Large Case. It tells us the 
75% confidence interval of ROI for the Build Large Case is from 17.1% to 18.4% 
with a mean of 17.7%. It indicates that we have 75% confidence that the ROI of the 
Build Large Case will be in 17.1% to 18.4% range, and the average level of ROI for 
500 iterations simulation is 17.7%.
Figure 6-3: Simulation Result for 5.5 Billion/day Case (Build Large)— Accumulative Curve
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Figure 6-4 shows the simulation result for the Compressor Case. This is a histogram 
which shows the 90% confidence interval of ROI for the Compressor Case is from 
18.4% to 20.6% with a mean of 19.4%. It indicates that we have 90% confidence 
that the ROI of the Compressor Case will be in 18.4% to 20.6% range, and the 
average level of ROI for 500 iterations simulation is 19.4%.
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Figure 6-4: Simulation Result for 5.5 Billion/day Case (Compressor)
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Figure 6-5 shows the accumulative curve of the Compressor Case. It tells us the 
75% confidence interval of ROI for the Compressor Case is from 17.1% to 18.4% 
with a mean of 17.7%. It indicates that we have 75% confidence that the ROI of the 
Compressor Case will be in 17.1% to 18.4% range, and the average level of ROI for 
500 iterations simulation is 17.7%.
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Figure 6-5: Simulation Result for 5.5 Billion/day Case (Compressor)— Accumulative Curve
Figure 6-6 and Figure 6-7 show the results of sensitivity analysis for the Build Large 
Case and the Compressor Case. Notice the Figure 6-7 shows that the natural gas 
price of 2013 is more sensitive than the price of 2012. It looks like there is a little 
conflict against our previous explanations. The reasonable explanation of this 
phenomenon is that the Compressor case has $1,500 million capital investment in 
2012, and therefore the 2013 gas price would be a key factor to successfully recover 
this amount of money.
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Regression Sensitivity for ROI (Nominal)
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Figure 6-6: Tornado Chart for 5.5 Billion/day Case (Build Large)
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Regression Sensitivity for ROI (Nominal)
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Figure 6-7: Tornado Chart for 5.5 Billion/day Case (Compressor)
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7 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1 General Conclusions
It has been more than twenty years since the Monte Carlo Simulation start serving 
oil and gas industry. However, most of these risk analysis efforts were focusing on 
technical risks, such as base and incremental reserves, current field and well rates, 
well, platform, and facility costs, workover and operating costs, and rig scheduling. 
Commodity risk, like price, always be ignored or simplified. Since a natural gas 
development project holds a lot of risk because of unpredictable gas prices, a price 
risk analysis is necessary for good project decision-making.
The following conclusions are made based on the price risk analysis of this study.
1. The price risk involved in Alaska Gas Pipeline Project decreases 
significantly with the Federal Tax Credit (Price Credit).
2. The tax credit could add 3-6 percent to the rate of return on this gas pipeline 
project. However it might not be revenue neutral for the Federal Government.
3. The ALCAN Only 4.5 Bcf/day case would be the most feasible and flexible 
choice for the long-run gas development with less commodity risk.
7.2 Recommendations
I recommend that a reader of this study should consider rerunning simulations 
shown above when
1. The assumption of any determined input is changed. For example, cost 
estimates, production forecast, and rig scheduling may change while the 
further study is done on a specific pipeline route.
2. Any new reliable price forecast is available.
3. The price distribution assignments can be improved based on new 
knowledge.
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APPENDIX A -  SIMULATION RESULTS OF PRICE CREDIT BASED ON 
EIA FORECAST DEC 2001
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Figure A-l: Adjusted AECO Prices Based on EIA Forecast Dec 2001
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Figure A-3: Tax Credit Yearly Simulation Based on EIA Forecast Dec 2001
$ 
M
ill
io
ns
 
(N
om
in
al
)
US
$ 
Pe
r 
Mi
lli
on
 
Btu
 
(N
om
in
al
)
Gas Price Incom e Tax  Credit Mechanism>Monthly 
500 Iterations Sim ulation
(based on EIA forecast Dec 2001)
 Normal AECOEIA Example of an Iteration Price Floor Recapture Ceiling
Figure A-4: Tax Credit Monthly Simulation Based on EIA Forecast Dec 2001
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APPENDIX B -  SIMULATION RESULTS OF PRICE CREDIT BASED ON 
EIA FORECAST MAY 2001
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Figure B-3: Tax Credit Yearly Simulation Based on EIA Forecast May 2001
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Figure B-4: Tax Credit Monthly Simulation Based on EIA Forecast May 2001
